PARTS: Towards pointer integrity using ARM pointer authentication

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PARTS, Pointer Authentication for Run-time Type Safety

- Approximates *pointer integrity* using ARMv8.3-A pointer authentication
- Protects return addresses, code pointers, and data pointers
- Prevents pointer reuse attacks by enforcing run-time type safety

ARMv8.3-A Pointer Authentication

Embeds and verifies embedded Pointer Verification Codes (PACs):


Uses run-time type safety to generate modifiers:





PACing it up with PARTS


- Embedded in unused bits of a pointer
- Keyed, tweakable MAC based on address and given modifier
- User-space support in Linux 5.0 with kernel-managed keys
- Used via new PA-specific pac and aut instructions



Modifier can be used to define *context* for pointer

Pointer reuse

Vulnerable to pointer reuse when modifiers coincide! e.g., stack pointer as modifier in GCC / LLLVM –msign-return-address



- Secure modifiers created based on read-only code section
- Pointer type known both at creation and use
- Modifier not affected by memory copy
- LLVM 6.0 based implementation + Linux RFC patches for PA

Return address protection

pacib(ret, funcID||SP)

- Unique function specific identifiers generated at compile-time
- Different function activations distinguished using stack pointer

Code pointer protection

pacia(ptr, type)

- Modifier from pointer type (LLVME1ementType)
- Pointers signed on creation and verified on use

Data pointer protection

pacda(ret, type)

- Modifier from pointer type (LLVMElementType)
- Pointers signed on memory write and verified on memory load
 - Allows efficient register use

Implementation challenges


- LLVM backend looses high-level semantics, including pointer type
 - Solution: define new *intrinsics* for pac / aut operations
- Register spilling looses retains no semantics
 - Solution: must analyze spills to protect data-pointer spills
- Interoperability with non-instrumented libraries
 - Verify and sign pointers to / from non-instrumented code

Challenge: to prevent modifier must be sufficiently unique to value and:

- Secure: Cannot be stored in memory, hence cannot be random e.g., if securely stored, then why not just store pointer itself?
- Available: Known at both creation and use of pointer e.g., these could be spatially and temporally disjoint events
- Location independent: Storage location cannot be tied to mod • e.g., must allow memcpy and embedding in other data structures

PARTS performance evaluation

Based on estimated overhead of 4-cycles per PA instruction



- Return address and code pointer protection **0.5%** overhead (geo.mean)
- Full protection, including data pointers, **19.5%** overhead (geo.mean)



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