

Privacy Preserving AKMA in 5G

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AKMA

AKMA (Authentication and Key Management for Applications) is a solution currently under development by 3GPP. AKMA will support authentication and key management aspects for applications and 3GPP services based on 3GPP credentials in 5G, including the IoT use case [1].



GBA (Generic Bootstrap Architecture) was developed by 3GPP during standardization of previous generations of mobile system. GBA has purposes which are similar to AKMA. AKMA solution candidates can be seen as an evolution of GBA [1].



Additional Requirements

(7) HN should not know what are the NAFs a user is using

(10) Linking between a user's NAF identity and HN identity is not possible

(8) HN should not know the identity used between a user and a NAF

(11) A NAF user should be able to connect to the NAF seamlessly using any of the many USIMs the user owns even if multiple NAFs collude

(9) NAF should not know if two of its users are the same user of an HN





 $\langle g \rangle = G$

 $AV_{B_{-}TID} = \mathcal{E}_{K_{v}}(permanent_{-}id, K_{NAF})||pointer$ $\mathcal{A} = \{AV_{i}| \text{ for all } i \text{ s.t. } i \text{ is an active } B_{-}TID \text{ in the BSF} \}$ \mathcal{A}

pointer = $H(B_{-}TID, K_p)$

Extracts $g^a, K_{\rm NAF}$

Fig: Privacy Preserving Variant AKMA

(Fulfills all the 3GPP-identified and most of the newly identified requirements of AKMA)

References

 $S(g^{psid*m*n*a})$ $S(g^{psid*m*n*a})$ (viii) validates the signature and computes g^{n*a}

Fig: AKMA Based on Delay Target DHP

(Fulfills all but one of the new requirements. Further research needed to conclude if it fulfills all of the 3GPP requirements)

[1] 3GPP: 3GPP TR 33.835 Study on authentication and key management for applications; based on 3GPP credential in 5G V0.4.0 (March 2019)