

Privacy issues of autonomous shared vehicles

Motivation


- **Autonomous vehicles** are an important car sharing service scenario
- Car sharing operators **track users continuously** during user trip → **privacy** concerns
- One option is to **refuse continuous tracking** and to use **selective tracking interval**
- It is important to find a **trade-off** between user **privacy** and car owner **assurance**

Privacy calculations

- We focus on location privacy i.e. how to preserve **uncertainty** about user **path** while **maintaining assurance** for car owner
- How to **find** privacy level that **satisfies both user and car owner?**


Shannon Entropy measures adversary uncertainty:

$$H(X) = - \sum_{x \in X} p(x) \log_2 p(x)$$



Maximum movement boundary attack*

- Car owner can find visited POI even if no permanent tracking




- Attacker can find potential **position** of a user based on moving speed

Design consideration using attack principle


- **No stop probability** based on lognormal distribution
- **Probability of visit** POI using mean **time** to visit and POI **rating** with help of normal distribution
- Total **entropy** for path created by Google maps

Design

- Three phases of service timeline



- Main focus on location privacy during the trip






Implementation

Google maps:

- Both user and vehicle owner can find **potential path**
- User can choose most **private path**
- Car owner can **evaluate** where is user at moment
- Library can be embedded to maps applications

Another way of use:

- Path can be recovered if user was spotted between two points
- If surveillance spots are known, user can increase its privacy during journey



*Ghinita G, et al. (2009) Preventing velocity-based linkage attacks in location-aware applications. Proc. of the 17th ACM SIGSPATIAL int. conf. on advances in geographic information systems, pp 246–255