

Threat Modeling Framework for Mobile Communication Systems

Problem Statement

Lack of a common taxonomy and metrics to capture a high-level overview of threats and adversary behaviors specific to mobile communication system

Goal

Create a threat modeling framework to provide a structured way to communicate security issues using a common language and reference framework describing adversary behaviors and threats in telecom networks.

Current Developed Framework

| Attack Mounting | | | | Attack Execution | | | Attack Results | |
|---|--|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|--|---------------------------|---|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Reconnaissance | Initial Access | Persistence | Discovery | Lateral Movement | Standard Protocol Misuse | Defense Evasion | Collection | Impact |
| Perimeter mapping of network infrastructure | Access from UE | Infecting UE hardware or software | Operator network mapping | Exploit roaming agreements | SS7-based techniques | Malware anti-detection techniques | Admin, node, and user credentials | Location tracking |
| Perimeter mapping for mobiles | SIM-based compromised | Infecting network elements | CN-protocol scanning | Abusing interworking functionalities | Diameter-based techniques | Blacklist evasion | User-specific identifiers | Calls eavesdropping |
| Target intelligence gathering | Access from radio access network | Hard-to-repair vulnerabilities | Target intelligence gathering | Core-network access from compromised base station | GTP-based techniques | Exploit misconfigurations & implementation errors | Communication metadata | SMS and IMS interception |
| | Access from partner mobile network | Command and control channels | Internal resource search | Exploit platform- & service-specific vulnerabilities | IP-based techniques | Bypass firewall | User data | Data interception |
| | Access from inside the operator network | | UE knocking | | Pre-AKA techniques | Bypass homerouting | Operator-specific identifiers | Billing frauds |
| | Access from operator's IP network infrastructure | | | | SIP-based techniques | Downgrading | Operator data | DoS against the network |
| | Access from the public Internet | | | | | Redirection | | DoS against a specific user |
| | Compromised Insiders and Human Errors | | | | | Stealth scanning | | Identity-related attacks |

Work so far

- Build a webtool to support threat/attack modeling process with the framework
- Model existing attacks from literature survey to verify the coverage of the framework and expand threat intelligence knowledge base regarding mobile communication systems
- Framework refinement
- Explore future use cases

Use Case Example – Graph Analysis on Attack Models

Build attack graphs and use graph-theory based analysis to indicate the **importance** of the techniques, the **diversity** of techniques an attacker can use given certain initial access or impact, and **common attack patterns**.

