



On the Effectiveness of Dataset Watermarking

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Watermarking Digital Assets

Watermarking: (covertly) embedding an information into a digital content

Prevents unauthorized use and distribution of copyrighted work





Digital media (image, video etc.)

ML models



Databases



Dataset Sharing Pipeline

Malicious parties might use the dataset without authorization monetizing ML models.



Dataset Sharing Pipeline

Dataset owners should have the ability to demonstrate that ML models were built from their dataset. \rightarrow Dataset watermarking



Existing Work on Dataset Tracing Methods

- Radioactive data, image datasets^[1] (white-box and black-box verification)
- Backdoor-based watermarking, image datasets^[2] (black-box verification)
- Audio-watermarking using frequency domain, audio datasets^[3] (black-box verification)



Clean image

Radioactive data (noise in feature space)



Backdoor-based watermarking (noise in pixel space)

Can be identified and mitigated by backdoor removal methods^[4]



[1] Sablayrolles, Alexandre, et al. "Radioactive data: tracing through training." ICML'20. <u>https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.00937</u>
 [2] Li, Yiming, et al. "Open-sourced Dataset Protection via Backdoor Watermarking." <u>https://arxiv.org/abs/2010.05821</u>
 [3] Kim, Wansoo, and Kyogu Lee. "Digital Watermarking For Protecting Audio Classification Datasets." ICASSP'20. <u>https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9053869</u>
 [4] Wang, Bolun et al. "Neural Cleanse: Identifying and Mitigating Backdoor Attacks in Neural Networks" S&P'19 <u>https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8835365</u>

Radioactive data

Intended for tracing provenance, not ownership verification

- Shifts samples belonging to a class in the direction *u*.
- Aligns classifier w (e.g., last layer of DNN) with the direction u.



White-box verification

- Cosine similarity c(u, w)
- Hypothesis testing
 - $H_0 = w$ was trained using clean data
 - $H_1 = w$ was trained using watermarked data

Black-box verification

 Loss difference between clean and watermarked samples

[1] Sablayrolles, Alexandre, et al. "Radioactive data: tracing through training." ICML'20. https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.00937

Black-box verification

Black-box verification is effective in all settings.

	watermarking ratio	test accuracy	test accuracy white-box		white-box
Dataset	wm _r	$Acc(\cdot)$	verif. w/ D _{test}	verification	verif. w/ \tilde{D}_{wm}
	marker	87.27%	-0.480	-0.275	-0.480
CIFAR10 (5000 images per class)	10%	86.81%	-2.804	0.171	-9.563
	20%	marking ratiotest accuracywhite-boxblack-b wm_r $Acc(\cdot)$ verif. w/ D_{test} verificatmarker 87.27% -0.480-0.275 10% 86.81% -2.8040.171 20% 85.95% -1.8350.260marker 85.17% -0.508-3.430 10% 86.97% -0.4840.022 20% 86.03% -0.2490.023marker 76.70% -0.361-0.667 10% 76.51% -0.4110.048 20% 73.40% -0.2660.057marker 69.83% -0.396-0.997 10% 65.64% -1.6140.077 20% 65.76% -5.7790.172marker 61.84% -0.176-2.097 10% 61.62% -4.8940.277 20% 60.82% -9.5560.467	0.260	-12.098	
	marker	85.17%	-0.508	-3.430	-0.508
CIFAR10* (500 images per class)	10%	86.97%	-0.484	0.022	-0.386
	20%	86.03%	-0.249	0.023	-0.863
	marker	76.70%	-0.361	-0.667	-0.361
CIFAR30 (500 images per class)	10%	76.51%	-0.411	0.048	-3.214
	20%	73.40%	-0.266	0.057	-9.177
	marker	69.83%	-0.396	-0.992	-0.396
CIFAR50 (500 images per class)	10%	65.64%	-1.614	0.077	-21.317
	20%	65.76%	-5.779	0.172	-26.183
	marker	61.84%	-0.176	-2.098	-0.176
CIFAR100 (500 images per class)	10%	61.62%	-4.894	0.277	-72.113
	20%	60.82%	-9.556	0.467	-102.160

White-box verification

Effectiveness in white-box verification

• fails when # of classes ≤ 30 or # of samples per class ≤ 500

	watermarking ratio	test accuracy	white-box	black-box	white-box
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Improving white-box verification

Effectiveness in white-box verification

- fails when # of classes ≤ 30 or # of samples per class ≤ 500
- can be restored by using watermarked samples for verification (p-value ≤ 0.001)

	watermarking ratio	test accuracy	white-box	black-box	white-box
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Black-box verification in the presence of adversaries

Black-box verification is effective in all settings

But the algorithm inherently exposes watermarked and clean samples

- Adversary can detect watermarks at 10% of the inference time cost.
- Verifier can perturb ($\epsilon \le 0.40$) watermark queries to for a successful verification

	watermarking	rking epsilon values vs. black-box verification								
	ratio	0.0	0.01	0.05	0.10	0.25	0.40	0.50	0.75	0.90
CIFAR10 (5000 images	10%	0.171	0.171	0.171	0.171	0.171	0.168	0.160	0.115	0.041
per class)	20%	0.260	0.260	0.260	0.260	0.260	0.260	0.224	0.076	-0.141
$CIFAR10^*(500 \text{ images})$	10%	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.020	0.012	-0.066	-0.196
per class)	20%	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.022	0.014	-0.061	-0.194
CIFAR30 (500 images	10%	0.049	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.047	0.038	0.018
per class)	20%	0.058	0.058	0.058	0.057	0.057	0.039	-0.011	-0.197	-0.430
CIFAR50 (500 images	10%	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.076	0.072	0.028	-0.059
per class)	20%	0.173	0.173	0.173	0.173	0.173	0.172	0.171	0.166	0.152
CIFAR100 (500 images	10%	0.278	0.278	0.278	0.278	0.277	0.275	0.269	0.232	0.164
per class)	20%	0.467	0.467	0.467	0.467	0.466	0.464	0.457	0.416	0.340

Radioactive Data vs. Model Extraction

Radioactive data watermarks persist through state-of-the-art model extraction attacks^[1].

	wm_r	test accuracy	$Acc(\tilde{F}_{\mathcal{A}})-$	black-box	white-box
Dataset	of $\tilde{F}_{\mathcal{A}}$	Acc(.)	$Acc(F^*_{\mathcal{A}})$	verification	verif. w/ D_{wm}
CIFAR10 (5000 images	10%	82.38%	$4.43 \mathrm{~pp}$	0.160	-4.042
per class)	20%	80.34%	$5.61 \mathrm{~pp}$	0.240	-3.256
$CIFAR10^*(500 \text{ images})$	10%	85.67%	$1.3 \mathrm{~pp}$	0.034	-0.561
per class)	20%	86.05%	-0.1 pp	0.062	-1.013
CIFAR30 (500 images	10%	75.44%	$1.07 \mathrm{~pp}$	0.002	-1.453
per class)	20%	72.01%	$1.39 { m pp}$	0.071	-1.490
CIFAR50 (500 images	10%	59.17%	$4.72 \mathrm{~pp}$	-0.020	-1.756
per class)	20%	63.92%	$1.84 \mathrm{~pp}$	0.143	-3.819
CIFAR100 (500 images	10%	54.76%	$6.86 \mathrm{~pp}$	-0.033	-8.276
per class)	20%	53.93%	$6.89 \mathrm{pp}$	0.198	-19.274

[1] Orekondy et al. "Knockoff Nets: Stealing Functionality of Black-Box Models". CVPR '19 (https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.02766)

Radioactive Data vs. Model Extraction

Radioactive data watermarks persist through state-of-the-art model extraction attacks^[1].

• Requires revealing ≤ 50 watermarked samples in black-box verification



[1] Orekondy et al. "Knockoff Nets: Stealing Functionality of Black-Box Models". CVPR '19 (https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.02766)

Takeaways

Radioactive data

- Ownership demonstration method for datasets
- Can detect unauthorized monetization of ML models



Black-box verification *algorithm* is effective, but attacker can detect verifier queries.

• Verifier can perturb ($\epsilon \le 0.40$) watermarked queries to for a successful verification White-box verification effectiveness is limited

Radioactive data watermarks persist through model extraction attacks An alternative ML ownership verification technique?

More on our security + ML research at https://ssg.aalto.fi/research/projects/mlsec/

Back-up Slides

Radioactive Data vs. Model Extraction

Radioactive data watermarks persist even after fine-tuning extracted models with unrelated datasets.

CIFAR10 (5000 images per class)							
		$ ilde{F}_{\mathcal{V}}$	$ ilde{F}_{\mathcal{A}}$	$ ilde{F}_{\mathcal{A}_{ ext{finetuned}1}}$	$ ilde{F}_{\mathcal{A}_{ ext{finetuned}^2}}$		
	Test $Acc(\tilde{F}), \%$	86.81	82.38	$80.17 {\pm} 0.54$	$81.74 {\pm} 0.33$		
$wm_r = 10\%$	black-box verification	0.171	0.160	$0.127{\pm}0.010$	$0.138{\pm}0.002$		
	white-box verif. w/ D_{wm}	-9.563	-4.042	$-3.727 {\pm} 0.596$	$-3.359{\pm}0.203$		
	Test $Acc(\tilde{F}), \%$	85.95	80.34	$78.64{\pm}0.568$	$77.13 {\pm} 0.45$		
$wm_r = 20\%$	black-box verification	0.260	0.240	$0.236{\pm}0.007$	$0.209{\pm}0.005$		
	white-box verif. w/ D_{wm}	-12.098	-3.256	$-2.631{\pm}0.604$	$-2.848 {\pm} 0.184$		

CIFAR100 (500 images per class)							
		$ ilde{F}_{\mathcal{V}}$	$ ilde{F}_{\mathcal{A}}$	$ ilde{F}_{\mathcal{A}_{ ext{finetuned}^1}}$	$ ilde{F}_{\mathcal{A}_{ ext{finetuned}^2}}$		
	Test $Acc(\tilde{F}), \%$	61.62	54.76	$54.37{\pm}0.20$	$52.99{\pm}0.38$		
$wm_r = 10\%$	black-box verification	0.277	-0.003	$-0.036 {\pm} 0.009$	$-0.018 {\pm} 0.017$		
	white-box verif. w/ D_{wm}	-72.113	-8.276	$-7.149 {\pm} 0.492$	$-7.516 {\pm} 0.222$		
	Test $Acc(\tilde{F}), \%$	60.82	53.93	$52.99{\pm}0.38$	$54.09 {\pm} 0.45$		
$wm_r = 20\%$	black-box verification	0.467	0.198	$0.176 {\pm} 0.015$	$0.252{\pm}0.011$		
	white-box verif. w/ D_{wm}	-102.160	-19.274	$-19.334 {\pm} 0.476$	$-17.982 {\pm} 0.571$		

Fine-tuned¹: Prediction vector is obtained using the victim model Fine-tuned²: Prediction vector is obtained using the surrogate model