

Security Analysis of the Consumer Remote SIM Provisioning Protocol




Figure 1: Common handshake and profile download

Remote SIM Provisioning

- The **embedded SIM (eSIM)** is a modern alternative to the physical SIM card
- It can be programmed with **SIM profiles** that contain the identifiers and credentials used to gain access to the operator's network
- Profiles are downloaded and installed with the **Remote SIM Provisioning (RSP)** protocol

Formal Verification

- We model the security of the RSP protocol with the **ProVerif** verification tool
- We analyze the protocol under partial compromise scenarios where one or more of the system components is not trustworthy
 - 11 authentication goals, 4 secrecy goals
 - 11 partial compromise scenarios
 - In total, **570 verification targets**

Verification results

- Five major vulnerabilities** discovered
- Based on our results, we provide practical recommendations for future development of the specification and implementation guidelines

| Partial compromise scenario | Authentication goals | | | | | | | | | | | Secrecy goals | | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|--------------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| | A | B | B' | C | D | E | F | G | I | J | K | W | X | Y | Z |
| 1: — | ✓ | ✓ | ○ ¹ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ○ ¹ | ✓ | ✓ | ○ ¹ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| 2: server | X ² | X ^c | X ^{1,f} | X ² | X ^c | X ² | X ² | X ^{1,f} | X ² | X ² | X ^{1,f} | ✓ | X ² | ✓ | X ² |
| 3: eUICC | ✓ | X ⁴ | X ^{1,6} | ○ ^d | X ⁴ | ○ ^e | ○ ^e | X ^{1,4,6} | ○ ^e | ○ ^e | X ^{1,6} | X ⁴ | ✓ | X ⁴ | (✓) |
| 4: LPA | ✓ | ✓ | X ^{1,9} | ✓ | ✓ | (✓) | (✓) | X ^{1,9} | ✓ | X ⁹ | X ^{1,9} | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| 5: 2nd server | ○ ³ | ○ ^c | ○ ¹ | ○ ³ | ○ ^c | ○ ³ | ○ ³ | ○ ¹ | ○ ³ | ○ ³ | ○ ¹ | ✓ | ○ ³ | ✓ | ○ ³ |
| 6: 2nd eUICC | ✓ | ○ ⁵ | ○ ¹ | ○ ^d | ○ ⁵ | ✓ | ✓ | ○ ^{1,5} | ✓ | ✓ | ○ ¹ | ○ ⁵ | ✓ | ○ ⁵ | (✓) |
| 7: 2nd MNO | ✓ | ✓ | ○ ¹ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ○ ¹ | ✓ | ✓ | ○ ¹ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| 8: order as user | ✓ | ✓ | X ^{1,7} | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | X ^{1,7} | ✓ | ✓ | X ^{1,7} | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| 10: code leaks | ✓ | ✓ | X ^{1,8} | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | X ^{1,8} | ✓ | ✓ | X ^{1,8} | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| 11: code spoofed | ✓ | ✓ | X ^{1,b} | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | X ^{1,b} | ✓ | X ^b | X ^{1,b} | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

Attacker owns some eUICCs in all the scenarios 1–11. Client-side goals are gray. No security is expected in Scenarios 2-3.

Table 1: Results for the activation-code approach

